Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will
Date
2022-07
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics ISSN: 1874-6373
Abstract
David Lewis’ contemplations regarding divine foreknowledge and free will, along with some of his other more substantial work on modal realism and his counterpart theory can serve as a springboard to a novel solution to the foreknowledge and metaphysical freedom puzzle, namely a proposal that genuine metaphysical freedom is compatible with determinism, which is quite different from the usual compatibilist focus on the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. This paper argues that while Lewis opens the doors to such a possibility, in order to fully elucidate a genuinely metaphysical compatibilist account, Lewis’ own counterpart theory must be abandoned in favour of an account of trans-world identity that is theoretically framed by a modified version of Robert Nozick’s closest continuer theory.
Description
Keywords
compatibilism, metaphysical compatibilism, free will, determinism, divine foreknowledge, trans-world identity, multiverse, modal realism, counterpart theory, closest continuer theory
Citation
Lenart, B. A. (2022). Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will. Metaphysica, 23(2), 385–407. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0041