Stackelberg-Based Anti-Jamming Game for Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks

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atmire.migration.oldid6109
dc.contributor.advisorFapojuwo, Abraham
dc.contributor.authorSayed Ahmed, Ismail
dc.contributor.committeememberNielsen, John
dc.contributor.committeememberDimitrov, Vassil
dc.contributor.committeememberEl-Sheimy, Naser
dc.contributor.committeememberNgatched, Telex
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-29T14:55:10Z
dc.date.available2017-09-29T14:55:10Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.date.submitted2017en
dc.description.abstractWith a target to address the frequency spectrum scarcity, Cognitive Radio technology emerged as a solution to achieve enhanced spectrum utilization through enabling secondary users to opportunistically access the licensed frequency bands meant for the primary users. Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) are plagued with new security threats besides the traditional threats that are shared with other wireless networks. Primary security threats include the radio jammers who deliberately transmit radio signals to block, mask, or emulate the legitimate active wireless connections. Acute radio jammers only attack at CRNs? vulnerable times to cause maximum damage while saving power and decreasing the probability of being detected. In this thesis, using the IEEE 802.22 CRNs as a basis, a security threat assessment is conducted, and a deception-based Stackelberg game anti-jamming mechanism is proposed. Unlike previous works in the literature, rst, this thesis utilizes the Bayesian Attack Graph (BAG) model to facilitate the security assessment of CRNs, providing a feasible metric of CR vulnerabilities. Using the BAG model, the probability of denial of service in the IEEE 802.22 networks was proven to increase up to 51:3% when considering multiple attacks in comparison to the most severe sole attack. Second, this thesis proposes a deception-based defense mechanism which aims at decreasing the contingent acute jamming attacks? likelihood in targeting CRNs? vulnerabilities. The Stackelberg framework is adopted to count for the bias in information which exists between the attacker and the defender due to the attacker?s reconnaissance capabilities. To this end, the Stackelberg equilibria between the attacker(s) and the defending CRN are calculated under the two cases when the players know and are uncertain about the primary user activity. Both theoretical analysis and numerical results show that the defending CRN can decrease the probability of success of the contingent acute jamming attacks when the defender has the incentive to defend the channel. Lastly, the thesis proves the usefulness of the proposed defense mechanism in the extreme case when the defender is uncertain about the attacker?s payo function in a repeated game framework through online learning.en_US
dc.identifier.citationSayed Ahmed, I. (2017). Stackelberg-Based Anti-Jamming Game for Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27869en_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/27869
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11023/4166
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisher.facultyGraduate Studies
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Calgaryen
dc.publisher.placeCalgaryen
dc.rightsUniversity of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.
dc.subjectEngineering--Electronics and Electrical
dc.subject.otherCognitive radio network
dc.titleStackelberg-Based Anti-Jamming Game for Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks
dc.typedoctoral thesis
thesis.degree.disciplineElectrical and Computer Engineering
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Calgary
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy (PhD)
ucalgary.item.requestcopytrue
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