Coalitions, the Me-First Rule, and the Liquidation Decision
| dc.contributor.author | Chua, Jess | eng |
| dc.contributor.author | Ang, James S | eng |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-01-27T23:00:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-01-27T23:00:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1980 | |
| dc.description | Article deposited after permission was granted by publisher, 01/14/2011. | eng |
| dc.description.abstract | Conventional wisdom in economics recommends that a bankrupt firm with liquidation value greater than going-concern value be liquidated by the creditors and that a firm with going-concern value greater than liquidation value continue to operate. Recently, counterexamples to the traditional rule have been presented. This note argues that violation of the me-first rule is responsible for these counterexamples. Since violation of the me-first rule involves the absence of value-maximization on the part of some economic agents, economic theories concerned with rational behavior may justifiably still assume that the liquidation decision follows the traditional rule. | eng |
| dc.description.refereed | Yes | eng |
| dc.identifier.citation | Ang, J.S. and Chua, J. H. (1980), Coalitions, the Me-First Rule, and the Liquidation Decision, The Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 11, no. 1, pp.355-359. | eng |
| dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/34043 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0361-915X | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48395 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | eng |
| dc.publisher | Wiley-Blackwell | eng |
| dc.publisher.corporate | University of Calgary | eng |
| dc.publisher.faculty | Haskayne School of Business | eng |
| dc.publisher.url | www.rje.org | eng |
| dc.title | Coalitions, the Me-First Rule, and the Liquidation Decision | eng |
| dc.type | journal article | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Centre for Family Business Management & Entrepreneurship Finance | eng |