Membership and Incentives in Network Alliances

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dc.contributor.authorNault, Barrie R
dc.contributor.authorDexter, Albert S.
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-04T18:38:13Z
dc.date.available2016-01-04T18:38:13Z
dc.date.issued2006-05
dc.descriptionIEEE: post print/author accepted manuscript can be posted to PRISM. Need to include citation and link to published version. (Link to policy needs to be included in notes field http://www.ieee.org/documents/author_version_faq.pdf.). Published version http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1624431&tag=1en_US
dc.description.abstractWe propose a general and precise model of a network alliance that addresses both the role of membership and the role of incentives in the coordination of actions and interactions of network alliance members. Using examples in such disparate industries as professional engineering, accounting services, and commercial fueling as the basis of our model, we show that a commission fee chosen by the network provider can be combined with a classical exclusivity agreement-which does not restrict where members recruit customers, while at the same time protecting the members' locations where customers are served-to motivate increases in member investment and, consequently, in network profits. We also show that the most profitable network size emerges naturally. That is, the most profitable network size restricts membership, and emerges as a consequence of the exclusivity agreement and the setting of the commission fee. Our results require that members' investments are more valuable with increases in other members' investments, that prospective members are sufficiently different that there is an adequate range in the business potential of members, and that the effect of other members' investments on a given member's business potential is moderately low.en_US
dc.description.refereedYesen_US
dc.identifier.citationDexter, A.S., and B.R. Nault, "Membership and Incentives in Network Alliances,” IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 53, 2 (May 2006), 250-262.en_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/28745
dc.identifier.issn0018-9391
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1880/51029
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.publisher.corporateUniversity of Calgaryen_US
dc.publisher.departmentManagement Information Systemsen_US
dc.publisher.facultyHaskayne School of Businessen_US
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Calgaryen_US
dc.subjectCannibalizationen_US
dc.subjectExclusivityen_US
dc.subjectIncentives and coordinationen_US
dc.subjectNetwork allianceen_US
dc.titleMembership and Incentives in Network Alliancesen_US
dc.typejournal article
thesis.degree.disciplineManagement Information Systemsen_US
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