Teleologism Full Stop: A General Theory of Ability, Agency, Obligation, and Justification

atmire.migration.oldid4278
dc.contributor.advisorFantl, Jeremy
dc.contributor.authorHebert, Ryan
dc.contributor.committeememberHaji, Ishtiyaque
dc.contributor.committeememberZach, Richard
dc.contributor.committeememberWilliamson, Timothy
dc.contributor.committeememberDenzinger, Jörg
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-29T16:24:15Z
dc.date.available2016-04-29T16:24:15Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.date.submitted2016en
dc.description.abstractDeontic modals are the topic of my dissertation. All deontic modals, yes, but justification in particular, and epistemic justification even more specifically. Deontic modals operate upon performances—they appraise performances. Positively appraised, a performance is appropriate, decent, justifiable, right, permissible, or proper; negatively appraised, inappropriate, indecent, unjustifiable, wrong, impermissible, or improper. Belief and knowledge and performances in exactly the same sense that action and intention are performances: all are products of powers that are in some sense responsive to reasons. The principal difference is the direction of fit between mind and world. Knowledge and belief the product of cognitive powers aimed at adapting mind to world, action and intention the product of conative powers aimed at adapting world to mind. All are normatively evaluable and the characteristic normative appraisal of each is deontic. Epistemology, ethics, and rational choice all investigate the nature of deontic modals, differing only insofar as the central aims are epistemic, moral, or prudential in nature. In this sense, the general theory of deontic modals is the parent to epistemology, ethics, and rational choice. My project is to develop and defend a schematic theory of justification. I achieve this end by developing and defending a general theory of deontic modalities. Riffing on two pithy turns of phrase, the deontic theory may be tersely sloganized: value first and one must do the best one can. It is a teleological theory that defines all deontic concepts from the theoretically foundational notions of ability and value. Roughly, a belief is epistemically justifiable if, and only if, it is part of an epistemically optimific belief set the agent is able to have. Roughly, an act is morally justifiably if, and only if, it is part of a morally optimific action set the agent is able to perform. My pet interest is in the former. The resultant framework is enormously fruitful, especially in epistemology.en_US
dc.identifier.citationHebert, R. (2016). Teleologism Full Stop: A General Theory of Ability, Agency, Obligation, and Justification (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27992en_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/27992
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11023/2916
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisher.facultyGraduate Studies
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Calgaryen
dc.publisher.placeCalgaryen
dc.rightsUniversity of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subject.classificationAbilityen_US
dc.subject.classificationAgencyen_US
dc.subject.classificationDeontic modalsen_US
dc.subject.classificationEpistemic justificationen_US
dc.subject.classificationEpistemic modalsen_US
dc.subject.classificationObligationen_US
dc.subject.classificationJustificationen_US
dc.subject.classificationPermissionen_US
dc.titleTeleologism Full Stop: A General Theory of Ability, Agency, Obligation, and Justification
dc.typedoctoral thesis
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Calgary
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy (PhD)
ucalgary.item.requestcopytrue
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