Aping the substantive epistemic subject?: in search of epistemic equals in the genus pan

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dc.contributor.advisorBaker, John A.
dc.contributor.authorFenton, Andrew Timothy
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-18T21:18:22Z
dc.date.available2017-12-18T21:18:22Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.descriptionBibliography: p. 293-314en
dc.description.abstractIn this dissertation I examine and defend the claim that chimpanzees and bonobos are substantive epistemic subjects-where to be a substantive epistemic subject is to have the capacity to engage in activities of an epistemic nature governed by rules or standards adopted, or learnt, by the individual in question and held in common with her belief community. In Chapter One I introduce, and in Chapter Two defend, six conditions for being a substantive epistemic subject that do not beg the question as to which animal species qualify. In Chapters Three through Five I set out to show that chimpanzees and bonobos meet all of these conditions, necessitating a discussion of various ethological studies of these great apes. As I show in Chapters Three and Four, there are compelling reasons for not only holding that chimpanzees and bonobos possess beliefs (or what I call Triple-I States) but that they engage in activities properly regarded as epistemic in nature. This constitutes a defence of the claim that chimpanzees and bonobos meet my first five conditions for being substantive epistemic subjects. With a defence, in Chapter Five, of the claim that chimpanzees and bonobos achieve a degree of epistemic success in their epistemic activities - which satisfies my final condition for being an epistemic subject - I provide the grounds needed to justify the claim that these nonhuman great apes are, in effect, our epistemic equals.en
dc.format.extentvi, 325 leaves ; 30 cm.en
dc.identifier.citationFenton, A. T. (2007). Aping the substantive epistemic subject?: in search of epistemic equals in the genus pan (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/936en_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/936
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1880/101937
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Calgaryen
dc.publisher.placeCalgaryen
dc.rightsUniversity of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.
dc.titleAping the substantive epistemic subject?: in search of epistemic equals in the genus pan
dc.typedoctoral thesis
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Calgary
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy (PhD)
ucalgary.item.requestcopytrue
ucalgary.thesis.accessionTheses Collection 58.002:Box 1713 520492230
ucalgary.thesis.notesUARCen
ucalgary.thesis.uarcreleaseyen
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