Liberalism and Pluralism: Assessing the Affinity

Simple item page
atmire.migration.oldid5276
dc.contributor.advisorHabib, Allen
dc.contributor.authorBoutland, Charles David Michael
dc.contributor.committeememberLevey, Ann
dc.contributor.committeememberMigotti, Mark
dc.contributor.committeememberHagen, Greg
dc.contributor.committeememberHolder, Cindy
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-26T21:07:19Z
dc.date.available2017-01-26T21:07:19Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.date.submitted2017en
dc.description.abstractIsaiah Berlin was the first in a now long line of scholars to defend and provide argument for the affinity between two seemingly incompatible views, value pluralism and political liberalism. William Galston and George Crowder offer contemporary versions of the affinity argument, what I call the Berlin project. Critics of the Berlin project, including John Gray, Robert Talisse, and Matthew Moore, argue that the affinity argument is doomed to contradiction, as the incommensurable nature of values under pluralism cannot lend support to any particular value or set of values, including liberal ones. I propose to avoid this problem by distinguishing between two types of moral value, personal and political. Separating personal values from political makes clear important differences in application: Personal values apply to individuals and help to shape the lives we lead, while political values apply to polities and help to shape the societies we live in. I argue that the moral upshot of pluralism is a normative demand for political diversity only, applying at the level of polities not persons. And since political values are not incommensurable with personal values, the contradiction does not arise. I argue such a move avoids central criticisms of the Berlin project and provides proponents a path forward.en_US
dc.identifier.citationBoutland, C. D. (2017). Liberalism and Pluralism: Assessing the Affinity (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/26755en_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/26755
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11023/3595
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisher.facultyGraduate Studies
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Calgaryen
dc.publisher.placeCalgaryen
dc.rightsUniversity of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subject.otherLiberalism
dc.subject.otherValue Pluralism
dc.titleLiberalism and Pluralism: Assessing the Affinity
dc.typedoctoral thesis
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Calgary
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy (PhD)
ucalgary.item.requestcopytrue
Files
Collections
Open Theses and Dissertations