Board Monitoring and Access to Debt Financing

dc.contributor.authorChua, Jesseng
dc.contributor.authorWu, Zhenyueng
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-19T21:46:16Z
dc.date.available2011-01-19T21:46:16Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.descriptionArticle deposited according to publisher policy posted on SHERPA/ROMEO, 01/19/2011eng
dc.description.abstractBoard monitoring should affect a firm's access to debt financing because it improves firm performance and the board is ultimately responsible for the firm's debt. In this study, we show empirically that access to debt financing indeed benefits in two ways from board monitoring: directly from the monitoring and indirectly from improvement in performance. The methodological challenge is in separating the two effects from each other and from those of other drivers of debt financing.eng
dc.description.refereedYeseng
dc.identifier.citationWu, Z., & J. Chua. 2009. Board monitoring and access to debt financing. Advances in Financial Economics 13, 119-137.eng
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/34040
dc.identifier.issn1569-3732
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1880/48381
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherEmerald Group Publishing Limitedeng
dc.publisher.corporateUniversity of Calgaryeng
dc.publisher.facultyHaskayne School of Businesseng
dc.publisher.hasversionPost-print
dc.publisher.urlhttp://www.emeraldinsight.com/books.htm?issn=1569-3732eng
dc.titleBoard Monitoring and Access to Debt Financingeng
dc.typejournal articleeng
thesis.degree.disciplineCentre for Family Business Management & Entrepreneurship Financeeng
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Chua_Board2009_postprint_file.pdf
Size:
219.66 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.87 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: