General Chaffee's Small Wars: Institutional Culture, Command Intention, and Restraint in American Expeditionary Wars, 1899-1902
Abstract
This study examines U.S. conduct in two small wars in the Pacific at the turn of the twentieth century in order to examine the forces which contribute most directly to the maintenance or rupture of combatant restraint. The literature on the Philippine War and the Boxer Uprising often exaggerates the extent and influence of racism on combatant conduct, and prioritizes anecdotes of atrocity over a more contextualized survey. That interpretation masks the extent of real U.S. restraint in interactions with Chinese and Filipino populations in those conflicts, and ignores factors which play a greater role in determining troop behaviour. This study demonstrates that those factors, such as command intention, support from mid and low level officers, and limited operational objectives, are shaped by a number of internal and external forces, such as the nature of the conflict, the nature of the enemy, and the institutional norms of the military organization. It concludes that U.S. forces of that period applied violence instrumentally, and shied away from direct attacks on civilian populations. Restraint is possible but only where multiple factors align to create favourable conditions.
Description
Keywords
History--Modern, History--Asia, Australia, and Oceania, History--Military, History--United States, Law
Citation
White, S. (2016). General Chaffee's Small Wars: Institutional Culture, Command Intention, and Restraint in American Expeditionary Wars, 1899-1902 (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/26266