In Defense of Non-Comparative Harm
| dc.contributor.advisor | Habib, Allen | |
| dc.contributor.author | Taylor-Fergusson, Rachel | |
| dc.contributor.committeemember | Levey, Ann | |
| dc.contributor.committeemember | Latham, Noa | |
| dc.date | 2022-11 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-09-28T21:31:32Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-09-28T21:31:32Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022-09 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The typical account of harm, the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm, provides an assessment of harm as causing an individual to be “worse off” than they otherwise would have been. This account fails to correctly identify harm in a variety of cases. Non-Identity Problem cases are procreation cases where an individual is born with a disadvantage or into a poor environment, but this account cannot identify procreative harm, as the individual otherwise would not exist. Preemption Problem cases of overdetermined harm, but this account cannot identify the harm, as a similar harm would otherwise occur. Omission Problem cases outline a failure to benefit, which identifies harm where it should not, as the individual is worse off without the benefit. The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm fails to identify or over identifies harm. An alternative account of harm, the Non-Comparative Account, avoids these problems. I advance Elizabeth Harman's account, which assesses harm on the grounds that an individual is caused to be in a "bad state". Harman's list of bad states is: "pain, mental or physical discomfort, disease, deformity, disability, or death" (Harman, 2009, p. 139). Harman’s account can overcome the problems facing the Counterfactual Comparative Account. However, Harman’s account requires modification to avoid perpetuating an ableist ideology based on an outdated Medical Model of Disability. I suggest, instead, adopting a Social Model of Disability, then modifying Harman’s list to include only states that are intrinsically bad (bad by its very nature) and exclude those that are instrumentally bad (bad because of what it brings about). As such, I exclude disease, deformity, and disability from Harman’s list. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Taylor-Fergusson, R. (2022). In defense of non-comparative harm (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1880/115323 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/40329 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher.faculty | Arts | en_US |
| dc.publisher.institution | University of Calgary | en |
| dc.rights | University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Harm | en_US |
| dc.subject | non-comparative harm | en_US |
| dc.subject | Harman | en_US |
| dc.subject | Non-Identity Problem | en_US |
| dc.subject | intrinsic harm | en_US |
| dc.subject | instrumental harm | en_US |
| dc.subject | well-being | en_US |
| dc.subject | disability | en_US |
| dc.subject.classification | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.title | In Defense of Non-Comparative Harm | en_US |
| dc.type | master thesis | en_US |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en_US |
| thesis.degree.grantor | University of Calgary | en_US |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts (MA) | en_US |
| ucalgary.item.requestcopy | true | en_US |