The Last German Victory: Combat Doctrine and Tactical Performance in Operation Market Garden, September 1944
Date
2020-01-30
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Abstract
This thesis reevaluates Operation Market Garden, the failed Allied airborne invasion of German-occupied Holland in September 1944 by comparing the combat doctrines and practices of the British and German forces that engaged in the campaign, particularly with regards to command and control and the employment of firepower, and seeks to assess the degree to which each force was actually suited to the circumstances that they faced during the operation. The study concludes that German combat doctrine and training, based around a highly decentralized and proactive command ethos and a high level of small-unit tactical proficiency, was a major factor in their ability to effectively cope with the unexpected Allied attack and the confused combat situation it created. Conversely, the British forces were hampered by the fact that their own doctrine, based around rigid centralized control, cautious set-piece battle planning and the maximal use of artillery and aerial firepower, proved itself ineffective in adapting to the confused and fast moving situation that their own surprise offensive created, ensuring that they were unable to achieve their objectives.
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Second World War, German Army, British Army, Military Doctrine, Operation Market Garden, Battle of Arnhem, Airborne Operations
Citation
Bates, A. C. (2020). The Last German Victory: Combat Doctrine and Tactical Performance in Operation Market Garden, September 1944 (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca.