The Last German Victory: Combat Doctrine and Tactical Performance in Operation Market Garden, September 1944

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dc.contributor.advisorHill, Alexander
dc.contributor.authorBates, Aaron Christopher
dc.contributor.committeememberTerriff, Terry
dc.contributor.committeememberStapleton, Tim J.
dc.date2020-06
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-31T17:12:16Z
dc.date.available2020-01-31T17:12:16Z
dc.date.issued2020-01-30
dc.description.abstractThis thesis reevaluates Operation Market Garden, the failed Allied airborne invasion of German-occupied Holland in September 1944 by comparing the combat doctrines and practices of the British and German forces that engaged in the campaign, particularly with regards to command and control and the employment of firepower, and seeks to assess the degree to which each force was actually suited to the circumstances that they faced during the operation. The study concludes that German combat doctrine and training, based around a highly decentralized and proactive command ethos and a high level of small-unit tactical proficiency, was a major factor in their ability to effectively cope with the unexpected Allied attack and the confused combat situation it created. Conversely, the British forces were hampered by the fact that their own doctrine, based around rigid centralized control, cautious set-piece battle planning and the maximal use of artillery and aerial firepower, proved itself ineffective in adapting to the confused and fast moving situation that their own surprise offensive created, ensuring that they were unable to achieve their objectives.en_US
dc.identifier.citationBates, A. C. (2020). The Last German Victory: Combat Doctrine and Tactical Performance in Operation Market Garden, September 1944 (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca.en_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/37539
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1880/111595
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher.facultyArtsen_US
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Calgaryen
dc.rightsUniversity of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.en_US
dc.subjectSecond World Waren_US
dc.subjectGerman Armyen_US
dc.subjectBritish Armyen_US
dc.subjectMilitary Doctrineen_US
dc.subjectOperation Market Gardenen_US
dc.subjectBattle of Arnhemen_US
dc.subjectAirborne Operationsen_US
dc.subject.classificationEconomics--Historyen_US
dc.subject.classificationHistory--Modernen_US
dc.subject.classificationHistory--Europeanen_US
dc.subject.classificationHistory--Militaryen_US
dc.subject.classificationMilitary Studiesen_US
dc.titleThe Last German Victory: Combat Doctrine and Tactical Performance in Operation Market Garden, September 1944en_US
dc.typemaster thesisen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineHistoryen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Calgaryen_US
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Arts (MA)en_US
ucalgary.item.requestcopytrueen_US
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