New Approaches for Secure Distance- Bounding

Ahmadi Fatlaki, Ahmad

New Approaches for Secure Distance- Bounding

dc.contributor.advisor	Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh S.
dc.contributor.author	Ahmadi Fatlaki, Ahmad
dc.contributor.committeemember	Fong, Philip W. L.
dc.contributor.committeemember	Jacobson, Michael J.
dc.contributor.committeemember	O'Keefe, Kyle P. G.
dc.contributor.committeemember	Valaee, Shahrokh
dc.date	2018-11
dc.date.accessioned	2018-05-25T21:13:33Z
dc.date.available	2018-05-25T21:13:33Z
dc.date.issued	2018-05-23
dc.description.abstract	In this thesis we design and implement three aspects of secure distance-bounding (DB) schemes as a type of authentication scheme that considers distance as an extra verification parameter. By adding this new parameter to authentication schemes, we can prevent certain attacks that are related to distance, such as relay attack. In fact, the attacking scenarios can be much more complex than the simple relay attack, in addition to the classic authentication scheme attacks. In this thesis we consider the most advanced distance-bounding attack scenarios in a variety of authentication models. We consider three authentication models in order to add the distance as an extra authentication factor: public-key and anonymous DB are the main fields of this thesis that consider strong adversary with access to directional antenna, and we consider One-Shot DB as a one-message authentication scheme. Each of these fields make a chapter of this thesis. Public-Key Distance-Bounding. In a public-key DB scheme, a prover who owns a key pair and is located within a distance bound to a verifier, who has access to the public-key of the prover, tries to convince the verifier that it is authentic and located within the distance bound. We provide a formal model and two protocols with security proofs. Anonymous Distance-Bounding. In an anonymous DB scheme, a prover who owns a registration certificate and is located within a distance bound to a verifier, who only has access to the public parameters of the system, tries to convince the verifier that it is authentic and located within the distance bound without revealing its identity. We provide a formal model and two secure protocols. One-Shot Distance-Bounding. In an one-shot DB scheme, a prover who owns a secret key and is located within a distance bound to a verifier, who has access to the corresponding key of the prover, tries to convince the verifier that it is authentic and located within the distance bound without receiving any message from the verifier. We provide a formal model and a secure protocol.	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Ahmadi Fatlaki, A. (2018). New Approaches for Secure Distance- Bounding (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/31947	en_US
dc.identifier.doi	http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/31947
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1880/106680
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher.faculty	Graduate Studies
dc.publisher.faculty	Science
dc.publisher.institution	University of Calgary	en
dc.publisher.place	Calgary	en
dc.rights	University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.
dc.subject	Information Security
dc.subject	Authentication
dc.subject	Distance-Bounding
dc.subject	Public-Key Authentication
dc.subject	Anonymous Authentication
dc.subject	Timeliness
dc.subject	Synchronicity
dc.subject	Identification
dc.subject.classification	Computer Science	en_US
dc.title	New Approaches for Secure Distance- Bounding
dc.type	doctoral thesis
thesis.degree.discipline	Computer Science
thesis.degree.grantor	University of Calgary
thesis.degree.name	Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
ucalgary.item.requestcopy	true